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Judicial Borrowing: International & Comparative
Law as Nonbinding Tools of Domestic Legal
Adjudication with Particular Reference
to EstoniaJUSTICE JULIA LAFFRANQUE*

The article analyzes the pros and cons of judicial borrowing, explains the use of international as well as comparative law in domestic legal adjudication with particular reference
to the Supreme Court of Estonia, and introduces the opinion number nine of the Consultative Council of European judges. According to the author, judicial borrowing means to
broaden one's vision; it does not stand for copying foreign examples, but for learning from
them and enriching one's own legal system. In this respect, the legal culture and traditions, as well as the mentality of judges, play an important role. One of the aims of judicial borrowing is to ensure the protection of the rule of law and human rights, as well as
the implementation of international obligations, and for European countries, effective application of European law. The author believes that if used properly, judicial borrowing is
more advantageous than staying in isolation from global legal developments.

I. Judicial Borrowing and Domestic Legal Adjudication
"It is a poor wit who lives by borrowing the words, decisions, inventions [,] and actions
of others. .. "
Johann Kaspar Lavater, (1741-1801, Swiss poet and physiognomist).2

Doubt is the vestibule which all must pass before they can enter the temple of wisdom ....

When we are in doubt and puzzle out the truth by our own exertions, we

have gained something that will stay by us and will serve us again ....

But if to avoid

1. The author delivered a speech on the same topic at the 15th Annual International Judicial Conference,
May 17, 2007, University of Michigan Law School. The current paper is an elaborated version of the speech.
* Justice, Supreme Court of Estonia; Chair of Consultative Council of European Judges; President of
Estonian European Law Society; Docent at the University of Tartu.
2. Johann Kaspar Lavater, in GREAT TRUTHS BYGREAT AnHORS 242 (Philadelphia; Lipincott, Grambo
& Co.1856).
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the trouble of the search we avail ourselves of the superior information of a friend,
such knowledge will not remain with us; we have not bought, but borrowed it.
3
Charles Caleb Colton (1780-1832, an English cleric, writer and collector).
In order to define the term "judicial borrowing," we need not confuse the term with the
notion "borrowing" in its every day sense. As seen from the citations given above, maybe
the word "borrowing" is not the best term, taken literally, to characterize the use of international and foreign law in national judgments. Who would be in favor of borrowing
instead of applying the law himself or herself, or even creating law?
Judicial borrowing, however, should have a much wider significance than just the adoption or use of the ideas of others. Judicial borrowing means to broaden one's vision; it
does not necessarily need to result in copying foreign examples, but can result from learning from them and using international, European, and comparative law as tools in domestic legal adjudication. In this respect, the legal culture and traditions, as well as the
mentality of judges-their open-mind and knowledge in foreign languages-play an important role.
One of the best ways to promote international thinking in domestic adjudication is to
encourage direct contact and interaction between judges of different nations and diverse
legal systems. Application and interpretation of international law, comparative law, and
for European countries especially, also European law, is essential in promoting the rule of
law and in succeeding with the necessary judicial reforms.
A.

DEVELOPMENT AND REASONS FOR JUDICIAL BORROWING

Montesquieu argued that the laws of each nation are those best suited to a number of
variables which, when taken together, comprise the quintessence of a people. 4 Factors
such as geography, religion, history, and form of government were determinative of this
essence.5 Instead, today there is said to be a "world-wide legal culture." 6 Perhaps the
truth lies somewhere in the middle -the best variables for legislature and judicial practice
of one country should be combined with a touch of global thinking. At a minimum, the
internationally recognized principles in the field of protection of human rights should be
part of the judgment-writing components for a national judge.
Judicial borrowing in itself is not strictly a contemporary phenomenon. For at least the
past several decades, judges around the world have been looking beyond their own states'
jurisprudence to international law and to the decisions of foreign courts in order to apply
domestic law. Anne-Marie Slaughter calls this phenomenon "judicial globalization." 7
Judges may increasingly resort to judicial borrowing for the following reasons:
0 Internationalization of societies;
3. Charles Caleb Colton on Doubt, in A DCTIONARy OF THOUGHTS 126 (Tryon Edwards ed, Edwards
Press 2007) (1891), available at htp://books.google.com/books?id=JIQcAAAA
J &printsec=frontcover&
dq=A+Dictionary+of+Thoughts&source=gbs-book-other-versionsjr&cad=0_ 1.
4. CHARLES DE SECONDAT MoNrEsQuIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia
Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1752).
5.Id.
6. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, (1999), 108 YALE LJ. 1225, 1286.
(1999).
7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, JudicialGlobalization (2000), 40 VA. J. LN'T'L L. 1103 (2000).
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* Internationalization of laws and, as a consequence, of domestic legal adjudication;
* International and European norms, as well as court practice, are rapidly growing both
numerically and in complexity, thereby increasing the focus of judges on international and European law;
* Common problems, such as organized crime, terrorism, environmental and energy
problems, etc., which urge judges to try to find similar solutions and learn from one
another.

B.

AMs AND AREAS OF JUDICIAL BORROWING

One of the main aims of judicial borrowing is to ensure the protection of the rule of law
and human rights, as well as the implementation of international obligations, and for European countries, effective application of European law. National judges are the guarantors of the protection of the rule of law and human rights. National judges are also the
warrants of the respect and proper implementation of international and European treaties
to which the state to which they belong is a party, including for the member states of the
Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, judicial borrowing is mainly used with tasks that protect human rights, such as in constitutional law,
8
in the framework of protection of human rights, and in judicial review of legislative acts.
It is evident that judicial borrowing is more frequent in the areas where there are many
international instruments. For example, in the courts of the member states of the European Union, European Community law is mostly used in deciding matters of administrative law because many European regulations and directives cover the relationship between
the authorities of the member states/European Union with citizens. Lately, however, the
EU law is gradually appearing more and more in civil law cases, as well as in adjudicating
cases concerning criminal law; the latter emerges in the framework of securing a common
European area of freedom, security, and justice.

C.

ITEMS, TOOLS, AND MODELS OF JuDIcIAL BORROWING

It is important for us to go beyond the reasons and aims of judicial borrowing to list the
items that will be borrowed, as well as the methods or tools and models how this will be
done. Under items of judicial borrowing, we mean the objects that will actually be "borrowed." Here we can talk about the following items:
* Law: general principles and norms, conventions, legislation;
* Legal practice, case law, and ideas in the judgments;
* Legal doctrine;
* Soft law;
A distinction must be made between borrowing of international/European law (international law as tool of domestic adjudication); and foreign law (comparative law as tool of
domestic adjudication).
8. See, e.g., Mila Versteeg, Harvard Law School, Address at the Human Rights Journal Human Rights
Brownbag Lunch: International Judicial Borrowing in the Context of Human and Constitutional Rights,
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-pbh/psn/updates/2006-2007/February-22-Newsletter.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2009).
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When defining the importance of judicial borrowing and its value-added purpose, it is
important to ensure that a well-established methodology is used in judicial borrowing. In
this context many questions arise, such as: "Is borrowing simply copying or comparing, or
does it at all involve creative thinking of judges?" and "Is judicial borrowing used as one of
the tools of interpretation, or is it used as fundamental argument in reasoning?"
The best course of action would be, of course, if the borrowing does not simply consist
of copying foreign systems and ideas; it does need to involve to a certain extent creative
thinking of the judge engaging in it. Judicial borrowing should not be considered as a goal
in itself, but rather as a tool in order to achieve the best solution. One needs to be very
careful about borrowing items without knowing their background and without trying to
find out whether they would fit into one's own legal system. Therefore, one should avoid
judicial borrowing becoming a fundamental argument in reasoning; it should remain one
of the helping tools of interpretation. Judicial borrowing should include comparative
analysis based on commentaries and interpretation of international instruments and the
experiences of others. It requires asking questions from colleagues abroad, other judiciaries, international bodies, and scholars, etc.
There also exist some formal channels for borrowing, for example, in the European
Union. Here, according to foremost Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, a national court may, or sometimes even has an obligation to, ask for a preliminary reference from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and bring the matter before
the ECJ.
Scholars tend to distinguish between the persuasion model and the acculturation model
of judicial borrowing.9 According to the persuasion model, a transfer of ideas will involve
the export of specified modes of implementation; whereas under the acculturation model,
a diffusion of ideas takes place at the level of general public positions and idealized conceptions of modernity and statehood.
II. Judicial Borrowing-Two Sides of One Coin
To a European lawyer from a country with a history in transition towards democracy,
where major legal reforms occurred, and comparative law was and still is part of everyday
life, it might come as a surprise that not everybody around the world is in favor of judicial
borrowing. The best example of the fact that constitutional borrowing has not proliferated to every corner of the globe is one of the world's oldest constitutional democracies,
the United States, and its Supreme Court, which have resisted this trend for quite a long
time. Today, however, some changes are noticeable. 10
Professor Roger Alford argues that judicial borrowing opens courts to "selective and
incomplete" presentations of the true state of international and foreign affairs." Of
course this risk exists; however, there are a number of advantages that should not be for9. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and InternationalHuman Rights
DUKE LJ. 621 (2004); RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING
HuMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2008).
10. See Martin Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF.
477, 477-503 (2006).
11. Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources to Interpretthe Constitution, (2005) 98 Am. J. INr'L L. 57,
at 65-66. (2005).

Law, 54
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gotten. We need to look first at the reasons for differences in attitude towards judicial
borrowing and then elaborate the pros and contras of the phenomenon studied.
There are various reasons why judicial borrowing is viewed so differently-praised by
some and criticized by others. Such reasons might emerge from the relations of domestic
adjudication with international (European) law. Is the country of origin where the adjudication takes place member of different international treaties, conventions? Is it bound to
international jurisdiction? The size and global importance of the country-whether it is a
global player-can make a difference in the attitude. History, legal traditions of the country, and the existence of legal reforms play an important part in this respect. If a country
is bound by international and European conventions, the judges need to take this into
account in their every day work. In doing so, they should not only look at the international legislation and case law, but also at the practice of applying the international/European law of other member states. They could get some help and, at the same time, some
encouragement for doing so from the international jurisdictions/courts of European organizations. A judge from a country with rich legal traditions, considerable size, and that is
an experienced player in global legal world perhaps tends less to look at the practice of
others. He or she has enough to study with all the relevant materials and doctrines in his
or her own legal culture, whereas a judge from a state of young democracy, where legal
reforms are still part of everyday work, would likely be more interested to look at the
experience of his or her colleagues abroad.
Furthermore, the attitude towards judicial borrowing depends on the concept of international law and norms and their reflection, transposition, application, and implementation in national legal order. Is monism or dualism favored? What is the status of
international law and standards in national law, including relationship to the national constitution? What is the position of international norm in the hierarchy of norms? Is it
above the constitution; below the constitution, but above a law or equal with a national
law or even in case of the agreements made by executive below national laws?
There is also a difference between borrowing or interpreting international/European
instruments, including case law, and borrowing the examples and experiences of other
countries. The former can sometimes be compelling; the latter, which should be facultative, can also be more dangerous as more mistakes could be made by applying pure norms
or case law of a foreign country.
Last, but not least, the differences in attitude towards judicial borrowing depend on the
culture and mentality of judges (justices), as well as the availability of international and
foreign materials and judges' knowledge of foreign languages and international law.
It is also important to ask whether the borrowing is only non-binding. International
soft law and foreign norms are not binding; however, for the European Community, law
norms can be binding and directly applicable to the member states, their citizens, and of
course, the judges of the European Union in interpreting and applying laws.
As far as the pros and cons of judicial borrowing are concerned, the following positive
aspects of this legal instrument can be highlighted:
To facilitate the achievement of the following aims: better protection of human
rights, implementation of international and European obligations of the state, and
effective application of international and European law;
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" To preserve the checks and balances necessary for a functioning democracy (this balance is very important because globalization tends to strengthen the executive branch
especially);
* To avoid isolation of domestic judges in relation to other judiciaries around the
world;
* To find the best solutions to common problems together and promote understanding,
even between different approaches; and
" To develop and enrich law. In the contemporary legal world, judicial creativity is a
well-recognized phenomenon, but it should not be arbitrary.12
On the other hand, some negative aspects of the judicial borrowing need to be
mentioned:
" There is a problem of legitimacy/democracy when using foreign law as an example.
Foreign law does not reflect the will of the people of the country of adjudication and/
or of legitimate representatives of people in one's country, although this problem
does not exist if the international instrument reflected has been approved by the state;
* Judicial borrowing is a time consuming undertaking; it requires the judge to conduct
more research than writing a regular judgment based on national law only;
• Judges have enormous freedom to determine which foreign materials they find compelling, therefore, they might abuse their power to pick and choose favored foreign
precedents; and finally
* There is a danger that judicial borrowing could become a product of an elite, nontransparent network.
III. International and European Law as Tools of Domestic Legal
Adjudication. Opinion Number Nine of the Consultative Council of
European Judges
In the context of using international and/or European law (especially in member states
of the Council of Europe and the European Union), the question that arises is whether
international/European law is really nonbinding or rather a binding tool of domestic legal
adjudication. Thus, we must talk about necessary or voluntary judicial borrowing.
European law, both the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of
the Strasbourg Court (European Court of Human Rights), as well as European Community law and case law of Luxembourg court (ECJ) is necessary in European countries, and,
for member states, is even compulsory.
The European Convention on Human Rights is in many member states regarded as
above the ordinary laws of the country, having at least a higher value than the ordinary
laws or even being equal with the constitution. The Convention is often used in the
decisions of the courts of the member states, especially in judgments concerning constitutional issues and human rights.
European Community law is in many cases directly applicable to member states (stipulations of the founding treaties, EU regulations and decisions, and sometimes directives).
The courts of member states of the European Union are compelled to apply and imple12. See CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OFJUDGFS 7 (C.A. Thomas ed., Oxford
University Press 2003) (2002).
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ment the directly applicable Community law, which has supremacy over national law,

according to the case law of the ECJ even when the Community law conflicts with the
national constitution.13

A decision of the Strasbourg Court in a concrete case is to be followed by the applicable
member state just as the preliminary ruling of the ECJ is binding to the court of a member
state which made the reference. But the case law of both of these European courts has a
much wider significance than just inter partes; the judgments build a sound case law to be
followed by national jurisdictions while applying and interpreting European law.
Therefore, in this context we should especially avoid using the term "borrowing"-in
reality it often means interpreting national law in light of and in conformity with international and European law.
The importance of international and European law as tool for domestic legal adjudication is stressed in opinion number nine of the Consultative Council of European Judges
(CCJE)14 for the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the
role of national judges in ensuring effective application of international and European
law.' 5 International and European law are seen as normal, natural, and, in today's world,
indispensable tools of adjudication in most European countries. However, problems
might occur in accessing the necessary information. There are also problems of "psychological" nature and specific legal problems. 16 For example, how far can a judge go using
international instruments, if its country has not ratified the international instrument in

question?
Opinion number nine of CCJE gives several recommendations of what should be done
in order to make proper use of international and European law and points out that it is
advisable even to refer to the non-binding recommendations of Council of Europe, both

in law-making and in applying the law by judges. Special mechanisms are suggested in
order to observe the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

13. See ECJ, Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, ECR English special edition p.E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585
(holding the supremacy of Community law over the national constitutions); seeECJ, Case C-I 1/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [mbH v. Einfuhr] 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
14. The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) is an advisory body of Council of Europe that
serves as a guarantor of judicial independence. It gives advice on issues such as the impartiality and competence of judges strengthens the role of the judiciary in Europe and issues yearly opinions. It is the first
advisory body within an international organization to be composed exclusively of sitting judges from all member states of the Council of Europe, and these judges serve as professional individuals who are not accountable to their governments. CCJE is in this respect unique in the world. Besides the opinions, the CCJE
provides practical assistance to help states comply with standards relating to judiciary; increases contacts
between judges of different member states, and organizes Europe-wide conferences. See Consultative Council of European Judges, http://www.coe.int/ccje (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
15. Id.
16. See Legal Co-operation of the Council of Europe with the Countries of Central & Eastern Europe,
Conclusions of the Second Meeting of the Lisbon Network, The Trainingof Judges on the Application oflnternational Conventions, Guly 4, 1997), http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/legalcooperation/judicialprofessions/lisbon/
meetings/Plenary/1997Bordeaux-en.pdf.
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Comparative Law as Nonbinding Tool of Domestic Adjudication
PARTICULARITIES AND METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW AS NONBINDING

TOOL

OF DOMESTIC ADJUDICATION

The primary aim of comparative law, as of all sciences, is knowledge. Comparative law
can provide a much richer range of models; it can be dcole de verit, which extends and
enriches the "supply of solutions" and offers critical capacity and opportunity of finding
7
the "better solution" for his time and place.'

The term "comparative law," however, must be qualified in domestic adjudication in
several respects. First, courts do not really undertake a comparison of law. Often the
courts refer to individual sources of foreign law without indicating why a particular country was selected. Secondly, in some countries there are limits of a procedural nature that
prevent courts from taking into account foreign law. On the other hand, in such countries
citations and references to foreign law can be found in well-reasoned opinions of advocate
generals (France) or attorney generals. Thirdly, the court can refer to a domestic law or
law book that is already based on foreign law (implicit use of comparative law).1 8
Therefore, the question of methodology is crucial in using comparative law as a tool of
domestic adjudication. It seems that there does not exist one single model of sound methodology in using comparative law. One should be extra cautious with using analogy without further investigation and reasoning. As there are already limits in analogical
reasoning, even in a purely national legal context, the existence of limits is even truer by
using analogy from foreign examples.1 9
Whatever methods are used, two questions must always be asked: whether the item that
will be borrowed has proved satisfactory in its country of origin, and whether it will work
in the country where it is proposed to be adopted.
German legal thinker Rudolph von Jhering has concluded that "reception" of foreign
20
law is a matter of usefulness and need.
B.

PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS IN USING COMPARATIVE LAW AS NONBINDING TOOL
OF DOMESTIC ADJUDICATION

Comparative law has proven to be extremely useful in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe in reconstructing their legislation and legal order.
Quite often, judicial systems similar to the domestic judicial system (belonging to same
legal family) are used as foreign examples. For instance, Canada and other states frequently cite the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court as well as, the Irish Supreme Court
2
and the U.K. House of Lords. '
17. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (Tony Weir
trans., Oxford University Press 1998) (1977). See generally PETER DE CRUz, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A
CHANGING WORLD (2d ed. 1999).
18. See ULRICH DROBNIG & SJEF vAN ERP, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts 4 (1998)
19. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1997), and M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRO.
DUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 1406 (7th ed. 2001).
20. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHES RECHTS 8 (9th ed. 1955).

21. See David Schneiderman, Exchanging Constitutions: Constitutional Bricolage in Canada, 40 OSGOODE
HALL LJ. 401, 402 (2002).
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Comparative law is not necessarily a binding tool, but mostly a non-binding tool of
domestic adjudication. One of the main problems in using foreign law examples is a problem of legitimacy; this problem is more acute when applying comparative law rather than
when applying international or European law.
A side effect of using international law, and especially comparative law (due to the legitimacy problems), is that judges may feel a stronger pressure to justify actions externally
(publicly); although this pressure can also have a positive consequence.
More problematic, however, is the risk of "superficial" borrowing. Sources of information are often accidental. For instance, judges search in various databases, including webpages on the internet, in order to find relevant materials. This superficial borrowing can
lead to controversial and inadequate information. Any references to other legal systems,
made by one of the parties, are taken for granted without going into further research as to
whether there are other countries and/or international norms and jurisprudence that contradict the examples brought by one of the parties of the case.
Comparative law can also be abused when only certain countries are used as examples
without justifying the selection. Judges frequently tailor or reject foreign law in accordance with local needs and conditions.
Due to a lack of time or the pressure to justify the selection, there is a danger that
comparative and/or international law could be set aside completely. This option would
also not be effective, especially if deciding a case of fundamental issue, and would not
result in a well-reasoned judgment. Another possibility, that addresses the time and capacity constraints, is that comparative and/or international law could be used, but the
sources would not be revealed-the "borrowing" would not be made public.
The abuse of comparative law can also result in excusing certain legal policy by pointing
out to foreign examples. On the other hand, an absence of a foreign practice can make a
void in legal regulation seem natural or necessary (an example of the use of comparative
law as excuse for its reasoning). Sometimes a judge cannot simply identify the logic of a
single foreign country that he or she finds convincing. Therefore, private preferences of
the judge are used that could result in abusing comparative law as tool in domestic
adjudication.
It is not always easy to guarantee that the judge understood the foreign law correctly.
Proper understanding is connected with the methodology of how the national judge interprets foreign law; does he or she use the legal materials, case law, any other background
materials, or legal literature of the country of origin from which the jurisprudence is borrowed? This understanding depends, to a large extent, on the language skills of a judge.

V. International, European, and Comparative Law as Tools of Domestic
Adjudication in Estonia-Reasons and Outcome of Extensive

Application of these Tools
Estonia is among the Central and Eastern European countries where comparative law
has proven extremely useful in reconstructing the legislation and legal order.
Estonia has a court system that consists of three levels. The first level consists of county
courts and administrative courts, the second level is comprised of circuit courts, and the
third and last level is the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia (Riigikohus) situated
WINTER 2008
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in Tartu. The Supreme Court is simultaneously the highest court in ordinary jurisdiction,
the supreme administrative court, and the constitutional court. 22 Many of the Supreme
Court judgments have defacto precedential value, especially due to the legal reforms that
have taken place and the need to develop law by interpretation.
Estonia has undergone major legal reforms in a very short period of time since restoring
its independence in 1991. Thus for a small country starting to develop its legal system, a
voluntary reception of norms and models of democratic European societies was necessary
in order to overcome the Soviet legal culture and re-introduce and strengthen the rule of
law. 23 One must, however, avoid copying foreign norms. One can copy the laws, but one
cannot easily copy the legal culture, the traditions behind the legislation, the implementation of laws, and the case law. This balance was not always easy for Estonia.
From 1995 to 2004, the Estonian legislature constantly worked to harmonize domestic
law with European Community law, including case law, 24 The enormous speed of passing
new legislation daily often affected the quality. On the other hand, this period also helped
to create and systemize Estonia's own very modem legal order that is open to all inventions of contemporary society and attempts to take only the best of the best from foreign
and international law. Since May 1, 2004, Estonia has been a member of the European
Union, and Community law has become part of everyday work for many Estonian judges.
Both private international private law 25 and international public law have been used by
the Supreme Court of Estonia in supporting its judgments. 26 These have been mostly
instruments of the United Nations, such as the CISG (United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods) and the UN International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.

27

To a much larger extent, however, European law serves as tool in domestic legal adjudication in Estonia, especially in the Supreme Court. Hence, mostly the European Convention on Human Rights, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and
different charters and conventions of the Council of Europe (conventions and charters on
social issues, local authorities, etc.) have been used in the judgments of the Supreme Court
22. Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia in English, http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id= 188 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2009).
23. See Marju Luts, JurisprudentialReception as a Field of Study, 2 JURIDICA IN-T'L 2 (1997). The Estonian
law journal Juridica has published several special editions devoted to the legal reforms in Estonia. See special
issues such as: 5 JURIDICA INT'L (2000) (discussing legislation and legal policy, as well as, legal reforms in
Estonia); 6 JUuDICA INT'L (2001) (exploring civil law reforms); 7 JURIDICA INT'L (2002) (commenting on
penal law reforms); see Kalle Merusk, Administrative Law Reform in Estonia: Legal Policy Choices and Their
Implementation, 9 JURsDImCA
INT'L 52 (2004) (discussing administrative law reforms).
24. See Julia Laffranque, Influence of European Community Law on Estonian Law and, in Particular,Lawmaking, 4 JURIDICA INT'L 82 (1999); Heiki Pisuke, The Processof Bringing Estonia'sLegal System Into Conformity With the European Union's Acquis Communautaire, in THE BAuTic STATES AT HisToRicAL CROSSROADS:
POLITIcAL, EcONOMIC, AND LEGAL PROBLEMIS IN THE CONTIEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THIE 21ST CENTURY (Talavs Jundzis ed., 2d rev. & expanded ed. 2001).
25. See LAURI ALmAN-N ET AL, RAHVUSVAHELINE ERAOIGUS (2005) (law book on international private

law).
26. See MERILIN KIVIORG ET AL, RAHVUSVAIELINE OIGUS 65 (2007) (law book on international public

law).
27. See No. 3-2-1-124-03, Riigi Teataja [RT] m 35, 363 (Civil Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2003)
(Est.); No. 3-1-3-10-02, RT m, 10, 95 (Supreme Court 2003) (en banc) (Est.), available at http://www.nc.ee/?
id=419.
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of Estonia (in constitutional and criminal matters as well as in administrative cases).28 But
even references to documents of the Council of Europe, such as recommendations (for
example European prison rules) and soft law, have been used by the Supreme Court. 29
In all of the above mentioned cases, international/European law was used as a supportive argument in the reasoning of the judgment. Thus, it was employed as an additional
tool for the Estonian legal system for interpreting the law in question. Sometimes this
kind of interpretation, by its nature a teleological interpretation, can lead to a completely
different solution if the Estonian norm in question would have been interpreted in a more
positivist manner using grammatical interpretation. Thus, the use of international/European instruments as examples tends to be more favored by the members of the court who
prefer value jurisprudence and more liberal, wide ranged interpretation (sometimes even
judicial activism).
It is of interest that some ten years before Estonia's EU membership, its Supreme
Court stated in a judgment that the general principles of Community law act as one of the
sources of Estonian law. 30 This statement was followed slowly, but persistently, in the
subsequent case law, beginning mostly in dissenting opinions of justices, 31 but later also in
judgments.
Today, we can say that more and more the Supreme Court has applied both specific
Community law and general legal principles of EC law including the non-binding Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter "the Charter"). It is particularly remarkable that the decisions of the Supreme Court refer to the Charter as a tool for
interpretation, which even occurred in three cases before Estonia's membership in the
EU. As noted supra, the Charter is not legally binding and, even if it will be binding one
day, in the event that the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, it will affect the member
states of the EU mostly in cases when they apply EU/Community law. To summarize the
practice of the Riigikohus referring to the Charter, two features can be highlighted: 1) the
Supreme Court has used the Charter in "domestic cases" (i.e. in matters that did not have
a direct link to the EU law), (but not as the only source/argument) except in the case of
distributing structural aid 32 and in a dissenting opinion that concerned the rights of citizens of other member states of the EU to belong to political parties 33 where the commu28. See Hannes Vallikivi, Use of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Practiceof the Supreme Court,
11 JURIDICA 399 (2001).
29. See No. 3-3-1-2-06, RT 1I 11, 107 (Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (Est.);
No. 3-3-1-14-06, RT 111 11, 108 (Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (Est.).
30. No. IlI-4/A-5/94, RT I 80, 1159 (Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court 1994) (Est.).
See also Uno L6hmus, Generally Recognized Principles of InternationalLaw as part of the Estonian Legal Systen,
[Estonian only] 9 JURIDicA 425 (1999), Hannes Vallikivi, Domestic Applicability of CustontaryInternationalLaw
in Estonia, 7 JURIDICA 28 (2002); Peeter Roosma, Rahvusvahelisejasiseriikliku higuse vahekorrastEestis [Relationship between Internationaland National Law in Estonia], in KONSTTLrrsOONIKO,-UD POIOIGUSTE JA VABADUSTE KAITSEL (1997).
31. See No. 3-4-1-4-98, RT 1 49, 752 (Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court 1998) (Est.)
(Maruste, R., dissenting).
32. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 364/01, art. 41, 2000 OJ. (C 364) 1
(E.C.), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf; No. 3-3-1-80-06, RT IE 1, 10
(Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (Est.).
33. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 32, at art. 12, .1; No. 3-4-1-105, RT i 13, 128 (General Assembly of the Supreme Court 2005) (Est.) (en banc) (Laffranque, J., dissenting), available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=391.
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nity law relevance was present; and 2) the Supreme Court has used the Charter in very
important and sensitive areas like human dignity, 34 the rights of EU citizens and issues of
democracy, the right to good administration (the Supreme Court has even referred to this
36
right in two cases 35), political parties as an expression of political will of EU citizens,
justice (procedural fundamental rights 37), solidarity, 38 and also the right to bequeath one's
property.

39

This summary illustrates the fields in which the Charter could be useful as a

supplementary source of law in Estonian legislation.
The Riigikohus has used Community law as a tool for interpretation not only in constitutional matters and matters concerning human rights,

40

but also in deciding cases in civil

1

and administrative litigation,4 and even in some criminal cases as far as European arrest
warrant and framework decisions are concerned.

42

The Supreme Court has also explicitly

recognized the right of the Estonian legislature to transpose EC directives into Estonian
law

43

law.

and has not applied an Estonian law that was in contradiction with Community

44

Today, comparative law as tool for domestic legal adjudication is used less in the case
law of the Supreme Court in Estonia than the international and European law. Judges use
comparative law arguments in their deliberations. They avoid, however, including these
arguments in judgments because doing so could give an impression of selective use of
comparative law and/or even harm the authority of the court. Mostly, when comparative
law is used, at least not in judgment, the judge does not elaborate on why exactly these
countries have served as examples and what scientific methods of comparative law the
judge has used.

34. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 32, at art. 1; No. 3-3-1-14-06,
RT I1 11,108 (Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (Est.) (opinion unavailable in
English).
35. No. 3-4-1-1-03, RT I1 5, 48 (Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court 2003) (Est.),
available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=418. No. 3-3-1-80-06, RT III 1, 10.
36. No. 3-4-1-1-05, RT III 13, 128 (General Assembly of the Supreme Court 2005) (Est.) (en banc) (Laffranque, J., dissenting).
37. No. 3-1-3-10-02, RT III 10, 95 (Supreme Court 2003) (Est.) (en banc) (referring generally to the
Charter and to the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, according to
which a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than that which was applicable at the time the criminal offence
was committed), available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=419.
38. The Charter of Fundmental Rights of the European Union, supra note 32, at art. 34; No. 3-4-1-7-03,
RT 1115, 45 (Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court 2004), available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=
412.
39. The Charter of Fundmental Rights of the European Union, supra note 32, at art. 17; No. 3-2-1-73-04,
RT II 8, 73 (Supreme Court 2005) (Est.) (en banc), available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=394.
40. See Joachim Sanden, Methods of Interpreting the Constitution: Estonia's Way in an Increasingly Integrated
Europe, 8 JURIDCA INT'L 128 (2003).
41. See No. 3-3-1-5-97, RT 11112, 136 (Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 1997) (Est.);
No. 3-2-1-66-05, RT 111 23, 245 (Civil Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2005) (Est.); No. 3-4-1-7-03,
RT 11 5, 45 (Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court 2004) (Est.) (referring to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU).
42. See No. 3-1-1-5-06, RT 1 20, 181 (Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (Est.); No. 31-1 -125-06 (Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (Est.).
43. See No. 3-3-1-5-05, RT 1m112, 177 (Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2005) (Est.).
44. No. 3-3-1-33-06, RT 11135, 301 (Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 2006) (famous
decision concerning the surplus stocks of sugar products).
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In Estonia, Estonian law, including international instruments ratified by Estonia, and
Community law are applied. Therefore, examples of foreign law in the Supreme Court
judgments are rare. One of the few examples where the judgment of the Riigikohus referred to the laws of other countries can be found in a case concerning the principle of
nulla poena sine lege in a criminal case against S. Brusilov where the constitutionality of the
Estonian Penal Code Implementation Act was challenged. The Supreme Court found the
above mentioned Act to be in conflict with the second sentence of section 2 of article 23 of
the Constitution that states that if after the commission of an offence, the law is amended
to provide for a lesser punishment, then the lesser punishment shall apply. Additionally,
the Penal Code Implementation Act was found to be in conflict with the first sentence of
section 1 of article 12 of the Constitution that stipulates everyone is equal before the law.
The Penal Code Implementation Act was found unconstitutional to the extent that the
Act did not provide for a possibility to mitigate the punishment of a person serving imprisonment, imposed under Criminal Code, up to the maximum rate of imprisonment established by a corresponding section of the Special Part of Penal Code. In this judgment, the
Supreme Court referred to codes of other countries in addition to international and European human rights instruments. In paragraph 22 of the judgment the Riigikohus affirmed,
stating:
Some countries have further specified or established the principle of retroactive force
of a lesser punishment in their Penal Codes. For example, the 1997 Criminal Code
of Poland establishes that if for an offence, for which a new law establishes a maximum punishment which is lower than the sentence already passed, a judgment has
already been rendered, then length of the sentence shall be decreased up to the maximum punishment established by the new law (§ 4(2)). The 1995 Penal Code of Spain
stipulates that a law which alleviates the situation of a person shall have retroactive
force, even if a sentence has been pronounced and enforced (§ 282). The same principle has been adopted in the 1999 Criminal Code of Latvia (§ 5(2)) and 1996 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (§ 10(5)). These examples allow to draw [sic] a
conclusion that the Penal Codes of several European countries extend the effect of
criminal laws alleviating the situation of a person also to the time of serving the
45
sentence.
The judgment was accompanied by a critical dissent from justice Eerik Kergandberg,
who argued that there are countries that do not use the system referred to by the majority
opinion, and thus, the comparative law selection of the majority opinion is not convincing.
Justice Kergandberg was of the opinion that to simply look at the stipulations in the penal
codes of other countries would not reflect the complete situation surrounding the protection of fundamental rights in the respective foreign countries. The dissenter argued further that the comparative law aspect of the majority judgment would have been more
convincing if, in addition to the plain meaning of the texts of the penal codes of the
Russian Federation, Latvia, Poland and Spain, the majority would have analyzed the doctrines (leading scientific works) of the lawyers of these countries about the current issue.
Justice Kergandberg questioned the selection of the "model" countries and did not share
45. No. 3-1-3-10-02 (General Assembly of the Supreme Court 2003) (en banc), available at http://www.nc.
ee/?id=419&print=1.
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the majority's opinion that these four countries represent the prevailing understanding of
46
retroactive force of mitigating punishment in Europe.
On the other hand, in Estonia comparative law is seen as a normal part of every scientific work and curricula at law schools. It is important to draw borders, to know how far to
go by using foreign law examples, and to know how many times they really prove to be
helpful.
Therefore, comparative law is used much more carefully than international law or European judicial practice.
VI.

Judicial Borrowing in International and European Jurisdictions

Without going to details, as this would be a separate subject of research, it is interesting
to note that the use of international, European, and comparative law in legal adjudication
is not only common to domestic jurisdictions but is also practiced at the courts of international and European organizations.
This use is often due to mutual influences: International and European courts in set47
ding disputes can use national laws and case law as tools of interpretation.
Judicial borrowing is relatively broadly practiced by the European Court of Justice.
This mission derives from paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 6 of the Treaty on European
Union that states that the European Union was founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law-principles
that are common to the member states. "The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms-and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of Community law." 48 The ECJ, however, prefers
European norms to international ones and does not always refer to its sources of inspirations (European Convention on Human Rights, the Strasbourg court case law, European
legal traditions, and legal concepts common to its member states, etc.). More likely an
advocate general of the ECJ will cite national legislation in his or her opinion, as well as
legal doctrine and case law of member states.
VII. Questions and Keywords Concerning the Best Practice of Judicial
Borrowing
Besides the aims of judicial borrowing, which are legitimate and include as listed above
the protection of human rights and application of international norms, one should also
draw attention to the following questions. Does judicial borrowing settle prejudicial be46. See id. at 1 10 (Kergandberg, E., dissenting).
47. See Daniel Halberstam, The Bride of Messina or European Democracy and the Limits of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in ALTNFULAND: TiHE EU CONSTITLrrION IN A CoNTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE (J.H.H. Weiler &
Christopher L. Eisgruber, eds., Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04 2004), available at http://www.jeanmonnet
program.org/papers/04/040501-20.pdf (stressing that Members of the European Court of Justice are educated in national settings and thus generally more comfortable with domestic constitutional modes of legal
analysis than they are with interpreting intergovernmental treaties).
48. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
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liefs and attitudes? Does it serve liberal, as opposed to illiberal, outcomes? And, above all,
49
does the local use of transnational norms serve the interests of local citizens?
In today's world, where it is impossible for domestic case law to stay in isolation from
global legal developments, it seems reasonable to be generally in favor of judicial borrowing ; however, judicial borrowing should not be mechanical. It should be creative and not
abusive, and it should respect the legal principles recognized by democratic states and
promote them. It should understand the background of the norm that it is intended to
borrow, as well as case law of the respective foreign country and/or international court
concerning the concrete problem. Judges should use the norm or case law to be borrowed
as a tool of interpretation while considering their own local legal culture and traditions.
Judicial borrowing has become an overall trend in Europe. It is difficult to imagine
national judgments of member states from European organizations that do not take into
account the relevant Community law and case law of the European Court of Justice, as
well as the European Convention on Human Rights and respective existing case law.
Due to the fact that European judges are more frequently using supranational European
law or European human rights law, these judges are also looking more to what the other
judges in other European countries do and how they apply European law. They might
not only refer to the practice of their colleagues in their judgments, but may also write
50
useful studies and create helpful data-bases.
In order to make the best out of judicial borrowing the following is needed5 l:
* In the field of training of judges in international, European, and comparative law, it is
important to grant judges full access to relevant information, foreign language
courses, and translation facilities;
" It is essential that judges possess a good understanding of international, European,
and comparative law; therefore, judges must receive information (including via the
internet) on recent developments in international law, European law, and legal events
in other countries;
" Training of judges is very important. International, European, and comparative law
should be included in university curriculum and considered in entry examinations of
the judicial profession, where such examination exist, as well as form part of further
and continuous training of judges;
" Translation and documentation services, libraries, and judicial assistants are needed in
order to help judges effectively apply international and European law;
49. See Wen-Chen Chang, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of The Law & Soc'y Ass'n: Empowering or Disempowering? A Comparative Study on Judicial Use of Transnational Norm (July 2006), abstract
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p96171_index.html.
50. See generally Conseil d'Etat, Rapport public 2007: L'administrationfranfaiseet l'Union europienne: Quelles
influences ? Quelles strategies?, Etudes & Documents No. 58 (2007), http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/074000224/0000.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2009); Cour de Cassation, Rapport 2006: La Cour de
cassation et la construictionjuridique europenne (recent judgments and research of French higher jurisdictions)
(2006), http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/pdf/cour-cassation-rapport-2006.pdf. See also Association of the
Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, www.juradmin.eu (last
visited Jan. 20, 2009).
51. See also Opinion No. 9 of the Consultative Council of EuropeanYJudges for the Attention of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe on The Role of NationalJudges in Assuring an Effective Application ofInternational
and European Law (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.coe.int/ccje (follow "CCJE Opinions" hyperlink then follow
"Opinion n9 (2006)" hyperlink).
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° Judges should possess knowledge of foreign languages, as well as have access to language training.
All the above mentioned require the states to provide adequate means to judiciary.
One of the key elements of the successful application of international, European, and
comparative law in domestic legal adjudication is a sound and functioning relationship
between national judicial institutions and international and European judicial bodies.
In order to make proper and effective use of judicial borrowing, contacts between different judges are essential. Therefore, the development of direct contacts and communications between judges of all levels, not only supreme court judges, in the form of
conferences and seminars as well as small scale bilateral meetings should be encouraged
between different national jurisdictions and national and international courts and tribunals. In addition, information of such events should be available to everybody via electronic means. Also, visits and study programs to other national and international judicial
institutions should be made.
Despite differences in legal systems, the judges and judicial institutions should ensure
that national law, including national case law, conforms to international and European law
and respects the judgments of international and European judicial institutions, such as the
European Court of Human Rights. One should reduce differences in application of similar general principles of law.
In the end, taking into account the above listed suggestions, the many benefits of judicial borrowing seem more advantageous than ignoring the rest of the world. It is hard to
believe a legal system exists from which others cannot learn and which only borrows from
others. Judicial borrowing is not a one way street and does not mean losing one's own
identity.
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